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LABOR LAW APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO LABOR
COMBINATIONS - In an indictment under the .first paragraph of the Sherman
Act 1 the government charged the defendant union of electrical workers with

1 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 1: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ..."
On the theory and history of the application of the federal antitrust laws to labor
activities generally, see: Black, "How Far is the Theory of Trust Regulation Applicable
to Labor Unions?" 28 M1cH. L. REv. 977 (1930); 30 M1cH. L. REv. 1257 (1932);
Harbeson, "The Present Status of the Sherman Act," 39 M1cH. L. REv. 189 (1940);
39 Mica. L. REV. 663 (1941); Teller, "Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes
and Collective Bargaining-the Hutcheson Case," 40 M1cH. L. REv. 24 {1941).

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

1245

forming an illegal combination to boycott electrical equipment manufactured in
other states whereby such products were either totally excluded from the local
market, or restrictions as to rewiring or reassembling were imposed upon their
use such as to constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce. In a separate
indictment the United States accused the same union of unlawfully conspiring
with the associations of contractors and local manufacturers of electrical equipment for a similar purpose and with a like effect upon the prices and competition
in the market. Defendant demurred. Held, that the demurrers to both be overruled on the ground that the alleged facts established an unlawful restraint within
the test of the Apex case,2 and since no "labor dispute" was involved the acts
charged were not immunized by section 20 of the Clayton Act 8 as reinterpreted
through the construction given the Norris-La Guardia Act 4 in the Hutcheson
case.11 United States v. Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 783; United States v.
New York Electrical Contractors Association, (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 42 F. Supp.

789.
Under the vague and elusive doctrine of the Apex case a combination in
restraint of competition does not violate the act unless the restraint has, or is
intended to have, an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise, whereby
purchasers are deprived of the advantages of free competition. 6 Obviously the
2 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940); 128
A. L. R. 1044 at 1075 (1940).
8 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 12-17, 28 U.S. C. (1940),
§§ 381-383, 386-39oa, 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 52.
Sec. 20 reads: "No restraining order or injunction shall be granted ... in cases
between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees . • •
unless.... And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person ...
nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the the United States." 38 Stat. L. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C.
(1940), § 52.
Before the decision in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct.
463 (1941), this section had been interpreted to apply only to controversies between
an employer and his own employees. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443,
41 S. Ct. 172 (1921); 34 HARV. L. REv. 880 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
4.47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 101-115.
11 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941); Teller,
"Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining-the Hutcheson
Case," 40 M1cH. L. REv. 24 (1941); 26 lowA L. REv. 862 (1941).
6 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940). At the time
the Sherman Act was first applied to labor activities, any combination in restraint of
trade which could be reached by the federal power under the commerce clause was
held to be violative of the act. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908);
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921); Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
In consequence of the steady expansion of the notion of interstate commerce, finally
extended so as to include production of goods in the "flow of interstate commerce"
[National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57
S. Ct. 6 I 5 ( 1936)], the courts gradually worked out a limitation upon the all-embrac-
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allegations in both the indictments were sufficient to bring the combinations
within this CStest." 7 Since the government established a violation of the Sherman
Act, the important question arises as to the sufficiency of the facts to prove the
absence of a "labor dispute" in order to neutralize the exemption granted to
labor activities under section 20 of the Clayton Act as supplemented by the
Norris-La Guardia Act. According to the conventional interpretation of section
13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act defining the term "labor dispute," tliere must
be a relationship between the parties to the dispute as described in subdivisions (a)
and (b), and in addition the controversy must concern "terms and conditions of
employment." 8 The range of inquiry of the court as to whether a dispute involves terms or conditions of employment has been delimited by the Hutcheson
case, in which the United States Supreme Court said that "So long as a union
acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and
illicit under section 20 [of the Clayton Act as interpreted by the Norris-La
Guardia Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of
the end of which the particular union activities are the means." 9 Under the
first indictment the "dispute" arose between the out-of-state manufacturers and
the union, so that the relationship sufficient for immunization under section 13
(a) and (b) is established.10 The Court, however, found that the union did not
act to improve "terms or conditions of employment" but "to better its own
position to the detriment of consumers and other workers ( whether union meming language of § I of the Sherman Act in terms of statutory construction. United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570
(1922); United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk
Co., 265 U. S. 457, 44 S. Ct. 623 (1924); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
289 U.S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549 (1933). Thus the Apex test was born.
7 The background picture of the principal case _is given in Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (D. C. N. Y.
1941) 41 F. Supp. 727. The prices of electrical equipment in the New York market
allegedly were 100% higher than those in the free market outside the city area.
8 47 Stat. L. 73 (1922), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § II3. Sec. 13 has been construed
in the following cases: New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552,
58 S. Ct. 703 (1938); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578
(1938); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91, 61
S. Ct. 122 (1940); Blankenship v. Kaufman, (C.C.A. 7th, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 450; Fur
Workers Union Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, No. 21238, 70 App. D. C. 122,
105 F. (2d) 1, affd. 308 U. S. 522, 60 S. Ct. 292 (1939); Columbia River Packers
Assn. v. Hinton, (U.S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 520; Green v. Obergfell, (App. D. C. 1941)
121 F. (2d) 46.
9 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 at 232, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941). By
"self interest" the Court evidently meant an interest of the union as a labor organization to improve conditions of employment of its members.
10 The manufacturers and the union are "engaged in the same industry," have
"direct interests therein," and the dispute is "between one or more employers • • •
and • • . associations of employees." Similarly the union "against whom the relief is
sought" is an association "participating or interested." 47 Stat. L. 73 (1932), 29
U. S. C. (1940), § II3 (a), (b).
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hers or not)." 11 Under an express exception noted in the A. pex case a labor conspiracy to exclude a nonunion product from the market does not constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act regardless of the impact upon prices.12 The courts
have also refused to apply the sanctions of the act to conspiracies arising from a
jurisdictional dispute,13 combinations to obtain more jobs for the union, H action
to prevent the use of labor-saving devices,15 maintenance of union standard
wages,1° or where there is any connection with the collective bargaining process. 17
11 Principal case, 42 F. Supp. at 788. The court also pointed out that no action
on the part of the out-of-state manufacturers towards improvement of working conditions of their own employees could have avoided the boycott.
12 "Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate the
competition from non-union made goods • • • an elimination of price competition
based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3 IO U. S. 469 at 503, 60 S. Ct. 982 ( l 940) ; see
also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549 (1933);
Natiortal Assn. of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263 U. S. 403, 44
S. Ct. 148 (1933).
18 United States v. Building & Construction Trades Council of New Orleans, 313
U.S. 539, 61 S. Ct. 839 (1941); United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America, 313 U. S. 539, 61 S. Ct. 839 (1941) (both cases affirmed
without opinion unreported district court cases).
H United States v. Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen, etc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 684, no appeal taken on the
count under the Sherman Act; exclusion of out-of-city truck drivers held not violative
of the Sherman Act because not falling within the Apex test. Distinguished in the principal case on the ground that it was not shown that there was an agreement to fix
prices or that the prices were in fact affected. But compare Hunt v. Crumboch,
(D. C. Pa. 1941) 4 LAB. CAs. 1f 60,355 (not yet officially reported).
16 United States v. Carrozza, (D. C. Ill. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 191, affd. per curiam
United States v. International Hod Carriers' & Common Laborers' District Council of
Chicago, 313 U.S. 539, 61 S. Ct. 839 (1941), combination to exclude labor-saving
truck mixers from the market held not violative of the Sherman Act. Cf. the contrary
result in older cases such as Boyle v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) 259 F.
803; United States v. Painters' District Council, (D. C. Ill. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 58,
affd. 284 U.S. 582, 52 S. Ct. 39 (1931). The court in the principal case attempted
to distinguish the Carrozza case by saying that in the latter case a labor dispute was
involved. Since the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the authority
of the Hutcheson case, it must have found a labor dispute, and the court in the principal
case was warranted in its interpretation. But the precise question in the principal case
was whether a labor dispute is involved.
18 Gundersheimer's v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' International Union of
America, (App. D. C. 1941) 119 F. (2d) 205. Cf. Hunt v. Crumboch, (D. C. Pa.
1941) 4 LAB. CAs. 1f 60,355 (not yet officially reported); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 119 F. (2d)
892, injunction under Sherman Act denied on the Apex doctrine; United States v.
Gold, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 236.
17 Republic Steel Corp. v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, (D. C. Ohio
1941) 4 LAB. CAS., ,r 60,668 (not yet officially reported), dismissed on the Apex doctrine. But where a dispute arose between a packer and a union of independent fishermen over the packer's right to buy fish freely, the Court did not find a labor dispute
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Some courts-following the letter of the Hutcheson case-did so on the basis
that a "labor dispute" was involved; 18 other courts, possibly perturbed by the
novel method of stautory interpretation used by Justice Frankfurter, preferred to
reach the same result by finding no violation of the Sherman Act under the Apex
test, the vagueness of which provides a comfortable way out.19 Since the indictment in the .principal case alleged that the conspiracy excluded out-of-state products whether they were union-made or not, the union could not invoke the exception of the Apex case permitting the combinations to eliminate differences in
labor standards. Thus the Court will uphold a conviction of the defendant if
the prosecution is able to prove that no "labor dispute" is involved within the
rule of the Hutcheson case because the union combined to gain an arbitrary
control of the market and not for the purpose of "progressive unionization" and
"maintenance of union standards." 20 The combination charged in the second
indictment falls squarely within the proviso of the Hutcheson case excepting from
immunity under section 20 of the Clayton Act the conspiracy of a union with
nonunion groups. The proviso, however, cannot be understood to meap that
the mere fact of a nonlabor group participating in a labor combination will bring
the sanctions of the Sherman Act into operation. Such a view. taken by a few
lower courts in a line of recent cases, 21 is just as unreasonable as the proposition
that the mere participation of a labor union in an illegal conspiracy of nonlabor
groups without any concern over conditions of employment would in any way
cure the criminality of the conspiracy. 22 The proviso seemingly means that in
determining whether a "labor dispute" is involved in a conspiracy between labor
and nonlabor groups the courts are allowed to exercise their judgment as to
because no terms or conditions of employment were in issue. Columbia River Packers
Assn. v. Hinton, (U.S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 520. See also International Assn. of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941)
118 F. (2d) 615, certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 639, 62 S. Ct. 75 (1941).
18 United States v. Carrozzo, (D. C. Ill. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 191, affd. per curiam
United States v. International Hod Carriers' & Common Laborers' District Council of
Chicago, 313 U. S. 539, 61 S. Ct. 839 (1941); United States v. B. Goedde & Co.,
(D. C. Ill. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 523. Cf. Columbia River Packers' Assn. v. Hinton,
(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 520.
19 Gundersheimer's v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' International Union of
America, (App. D. C. 1941) 119 F-. (2d) 205.
20 Principal case, 42 F. Supp. at 788. As to whether a secondary boycott of the
type alleged in the principal case is illegal even if effectuated in pursuance of a labor
dispute, see Steffen, "Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case," 36
ILL. L. REv. 1 (1941). Cf. International Assn. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers v. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 615, cert.
denied 314 U.S. 639, 62 S. Ct. 75 (1941).
21 United States v. Central Supply Assn., (D. C. Ohio, 1941) 40 F. Supp. 964,
where the court upheld an indictment under § l of the Sherman Act (see supra, note
1) without considering at all whether a labor dispute was involved and distinguished
the Hutcheson case by simply pointing out that the indictment at bar charged a conspiracy with a nonlabor group. See also United States v. Associated Plumbing & Heating Merchants, (D. C. Wash. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 769.
22 Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, (D. C. Cal. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 531.

1942]

1249

RECENT DECISIONS

the "wisdom" or "selfishness" of the purpose of the union. Thus an inquiry
into the objectives of the union is permitted in this limited situation, and an
indictment will be sustained and other relief may be granted under the Sherman
Act where the combination tends toward a misuse of the union for private
profit 28 or where it exceeds the sphere of legitimate labor ends so as to exclude
any appearance of a labor dispute.24

Eric Stein

Albrecht v. Kinsella, (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 1003.
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 727. In United States v. B. Goedde
& Co., (D. C. Ill. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 523, the court held that in case of a combination
of a union with mill-owners only the acts of violence and a boycott of any out-of-state
made material (including the union made) would be prosecuted under the Sherman
Act. Thus the doctrine of United (hates v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169
(1926), has been adjusted to the ruling in the Apex and Hutcheson cases. Cf. older
cases following the Brims case: Boyle v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) 259 F.
803; United States v. Painters' District Council, (D. C. Ill. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 58, affd.
284 U.S. 582, 52 S. Ct. 39 (1931); Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396 (1934); Greater New York Live
Poultry Chamber of Commerce v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 156.
23
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